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A CRITIQUE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD'S PERFORMANCE IN
POLICY FORMULATION: ADJUDICATION
AND RULE-MAKING *
CoRN hus J. PECK t
In the spring of 1968, the recent performance of the National
Labor Relations Board was subjected to scrutiny and criticism in
hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.'
The announcement of the Subcommittee's hearings gave special em-
phasis to problems associated with the combination of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers in administrative agencies. Concern
was expressed over the threat to the Constitution and representative
government if administrators assumed powers to modify or ignore the
will of Congress expressed in statutes. It was explained that the
National Labor Relations Board was selected as the first agency for
examination because of the importance of the functions which it
performs and because of specific criticism that the Board had usurped
congressional functions by applying its own views of desirable labor
policy rather than the policies that Congress had established by statute.'
In large part the witnesses before the Subcommittee attempted to
document undesirable and unauthorized announcements and changes
of policy made by the Board in recent years.
There can be no doubt that numerous and significant changes of
policy have followed changes in Board membership resulting from
appointments by Presidents of different political parties. The changes
have taken place without modification of the statutory language, and
must therefore be attributed to different views of the administrators
either as to what would be sound labor policy or, at best, as to what
labor policy Congress meant to establish.
A good example is the altered construction of section 8 (b) ( 1 ) (A)3
* This article, substantially in its present form, was first presented as a statement
before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Senate Judiciary Committee,
April 1, 1968.
t Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S. 1944, LL.B. 1949, Harvard
University. Member, Massachusetts and Washington Bars.
1 Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Independent Administrative Agencies
Before the Subcomn. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].
21968 Hearings -.
3 National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] § 8(b) (1) (A),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
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by Eisenhowever appointees three years after they constituted a
majority on the Board and ten years after enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act. At that date they reached the conclusion-later re-
jected by the Supreme Court-that the section prohibited recog-
nitional or organizational picketing.4 One of the Board members
later unguardedly described the action as based upon the following
considerations:
(1) If it [recognitional and organizational picketing] wasn't
against the law it ought to be, and (2) If the Supreme Court
of the United States overruled us, it would at least bring to
the attention of Congress a loophole in the law which it
might remedy.'
The Eisenhower appointees attempted a comparable change in
the same year when they held that exclusive hiring hall agreements
were inherently discriminatory and violated the Act unless certain
limitations upon the union's power were made in the collective bargain-
ing agreement and published to prospective employees.' The Supreme
Court likewise disapproved of this attempted change, and a majority
of the Court reminded the Board that where Congress "aimed its
sanctions only at specific discriminatory practices, the Board can not
go farther and establish a broader, more pervasive regulatory scheme." I
The creativity of President Eisenhower's appointees can be found in
other of their holdings: the decision that craft employees should not be
denied craft representation because they are employed in highly
integrated industries; 8 the decision requiring a choice between par-
ticipation in a representation election and prosecution of an 8(a) (5) 1
unfair labor practice charge; 10 the decisions outlawing "hot cargo"
clauses;" and the 1954 change raising the NLRB's jurisdictional
4 Teamsters Local 639, 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957), set aside, 274 F.2d 551 (D.C.
Cir. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
6 Hearings before the Subcomm. on the National Labor Relations Board of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt 2, at 1019 (1961).
Board member Joseph A. Jenkins (not to be confused with incumbent member Howard
Jenkins) explained that the quotation was taken from a speech delivered extempo-
raneously, and that he had later explained in answer to a question that he meant that
when there were two equally valid competing legal theories, he would decide in favor
of the one that appealed to his sense of justice. Id.
6 Associated General Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957), enforcement
denied, 270 F2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
7Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961).
8 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
9 NLRA § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
10 Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954).
11 Carpenters Local 1976, 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955), enforced, 241 F.2d 147 (9th
Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) ; Teamsters Local 554, 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
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standards,' 2 apparently made without realization that the preemption
doctrine would preclude employers from relying on and resorting to the
generally employer-oriented principles of state law in labor disputes.
Soon after President Kennedy's appointees became a majority,
it became obvious that changes in the law developed by the NLRB
were directly and immediately traceable to changes in Board member-
ship. The shape that prohibitions against recognitional and organiza-
tional picketing under section 8(b) (7) "a had been taking under the
direction of a Board controlled by Eisenhower appointees was quickly
and drastically changed.' A sense of the urgency with which the
revision was made can be gained by observing that in one of the
decisions in the series, an important change of policy, totally irrelevant
to the case being decided, was announced in a footnote.'5 Equally
important changes were made by freeing from regulation activities
previously thought to fall under the prohibitions against secondary
picketing.'" No time was lost in reversing the Eisenhower appointees'
ruling that an employer's decision to subcontract did not violate its
duty to bargain, 7 and limitations upon management's right to deliver
speeches to massed audiences of employees on company time soon ap-
peared.' Conditions established for questioning employees about
union activities or affiliation '" soon effectively overturned the Eisen-
hower appointees' earlier decision that such questioning did not per se
constitute illegal interrogation.2' Indeed, so rapid was the change that
one of the labor law reporting services found it appropriate to make
a new index entry entitled "Prior decisions overruled by Board." 21
More recent decisions on establishing a union's bargaining status
12 NLRB Press Release R-445, 449, 34 L.R.R.M. 75 (July 15, 1954). See Breed-
ing Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954).
14 NLRA § 8(b) (7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1964).
14 Bachman Furniture Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 670 (1961); Blinne Constr. Co., 135
N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962); Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962); Barker Bros.
Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 478 (1962).
15 In footnote 24 of the majority decision in Blinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153,
1166 (1962), it was announced that a union would not violate § 8(b) (7) by picketing
for more than 30 days without filing a representation petition if it had filed a meritor-
ious § 8(a) (5) charge-a conclusion of great importance and certainly not one which
immediately appears from a reading of § 8(b) (7).
16 Plauche Elec., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962).
17 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962) ; Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379
U.S. 203 (1964).
-8 May Dep't Stores, 136 N.L.R.B. 797, enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.
1963).
'9 Frank Sullivan & Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 726 (1961). See also Struksness Constr.
Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 21,558 (June 26, 1967).
2 oBlue Flash Express Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
21 Compare 49 L.R.R.M. 3539 (1961-62), with 48 L.R.R.M. 3534 (1960-61).
[Vol.117:254
ADJUDICATION AND RULE-MAKING
through authorization cards 2 show that the process of reforming and
reshaping the law inherited from Eisenhower Board appointees has
not yet been completed.
It is not enough, however, to conclude that the members of the
NLRB have been making policy decisions, and to tell them to stop
doing so. Indeed, to give such a direction would be to command the
impossible. If the Board members attempted to comply, the almost
certain result would be a lower and less satisfactory level of labor law
in action. This is so because the generalized provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act inevitably impose upon it the responsibility for
making policy decisions concerning the problems revealed in attempting
to apply those general provisions to the fact patterns which change from
case to case as do the vari-colored forms of a kaleidoscope.
For example, in 1935 the draftsmen of the Wagner Act might
have anticipated a possible conflict between the freedom in choosing
bargaining representatives guaranteed employees by section 7 of the
Act : and the preservation of collective bargaining relationships that
the Act also sought to accomplish. But no one, I submit, could 'have
contemplated all the problems involved in resolving that conflict. The
NLRB has produced an elaborate set of rules, commonly referred to
as the contract bar doctrine, which attempt a resolution of the conflict
between these and other interests. A collective bargaining agreement
meeting the tests established by these rules serves as a bar to a petition
for a representation election. The specific rules constituting the doc-
trine relate to the length of time for which a collective bargaining agree-
ment may serve as a bar to a representation election,' the significance
to be attached to the presence of an illegal union shop ' or "hot
cargo" clause"6 in a collective bargaining agreement, the effect of an
unusual or unforeseen increase in the number of employees covered
by the agreement,' 7 the timeliness of the filing of a petition,", the
insulated period for negotiation of a new contract,' and a host of
other problems.
22 Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). For a discussion of the
subsequent developments, see Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an
NLRB Election, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 851 (1967); Gordon, Union Authorization Cards
and the Duty to Bargain, 67 LAB. REL. REP. 165 (1968) ; Comment, Employer "Good
Faith Doubt," 116 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1968).
23 NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
24 Compare Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990 (1958),
with General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
2 Compare Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880 (1958),
with Paragon Prods. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961).
2 6 See Food Haulers, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 394 (1962).
2 7 See General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958).
28 Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
29 Id.
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These are not mere technical details, but matters of considerable
importance upon which Congress might legislate. They are no more
particularized than, for example, the congressional direction that an
election not be held in a bargaining unit within which there has been
a valid election in the last twelve months,80 or the statutory rule that
recognitional picketing may not take place for more than thirty days
without the filing of a representation petition.3 That the NLRB
undertook to make the policy judgments requisite to the development
of the contract bar doctrine should not be the occasion for congressional
disapproval; nor should the fact that the Board undertakes revision in
light of its experience with the doctrine be cause for criticism.
Another and more current illustration of the necessity that the
Board make policy judgments can be found in the unfolding com-
plications of the relationship between an employer's obligation to
bargain with respect to certain types of subcontracting,32 the pro-
hibition against "hot cargo" clauses added to the Act in 1959,3 and
the earlier regulation of jurisdictional disputes found in section
8 (b) (4) (D)." Depending upon the particular fact pattern disclosed,
a union demand, backed by strike action, for inclusion or enforcement
of a particular contract clause may be a demand that the Board should
support as included within the employer's duty to bargain, prohibit
as illegal "hot cargo" activity, or subject to its procedure for resolving
jurisdictional disputes.35 Congress did not provide a clear and un-
ambiguous guide to the resolution of the problems presented, but as
the cases are processed answers must be given. The giving of these
answers necessarily requires the exercise of at least a policy judgment
about what Congress would have done if the problem had been foreseen.
Further, unless one is committed to preserving mistakes, the Board
must have freedom to correct what experience reveals to have been
an unwise choice. As Professor Jaffe observed, the discretion used in
formulating rules cannot be used but once and then "put back in
the box." 36
The occasions upon which the Board must exercise a policy
judgment are not all attributable to the Board's inability to foresee
problems or to the ambiguities inherent in the English language.
30 NLRA § 9(c) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1964).
31 NLRA § 8(b) (7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1964).
32 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
3NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
34 NLRA §8(b) (4) (D), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D) (1964).
35 Compare Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), with
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967) ; Carey v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), and NLRB v. Local 1212, IBEW, 364 U.S.
573 (1961).
36 Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1273, 1285 (1955).
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Frankness requires recognition that from time to time the congressional
advocates of management and labor interests have accepted language
which obfuscated a problem rather than pursue a clear, but perhaps
unfavorable, congressional policy pronouncement on the matter. For
example, the legislative history of section 8(C),17 the "free speech" pro-
vision added in 1947, clearly reveals a problem unresolved: the extent
to which the Board may look at all the circumstances to determine
whether an expression contains a threat of reprisal." Professor Cox's
personal familiarity with the legislative history of the 1959 amendments
to the National Labor Relations Act has made it possible for him to
assert that the parties drafting the Conference Report had no common
intention regarding a very important aspect of the regulation of organi-
zational picketing, but rather had what might be characterized as con-
flicting intentions.3 Given such legislation, the Board cannot avoid
making policy decisions.
Since the NLRB will have to make and reassess policy judgments
in the area it regulates, a political coloration will inevitably be cast
upon the Board's activities. As Professor Jaffe has said, "Policy-
making is politics." 40 Of course the policy-making activities should
be kept at the minimum necessary for effective discharge of the Board's
functions. But it should not be forgotten that the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals play an important role in checking the NLRB's
ventures into unwarranted policy-making.41 Moreover, these problems
would not be solved by abolishing the NLRB or turning it into a labor
court. Unless vindication of the public interest in labor policy is to
depend on the considerations which motivate suits by private parties,
it is essential to preserve the office of the General Counsel, or some-
thing like it. The discretion that may be exercised in determining
which charges should be prosecuted and which should be dropped is a
discretion to shape not only the law in action but also the substantive
law created in the litigation process. It is, for example, common
knowledge that the antitrust policies of the United States can be sub-
37 NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).38 Compare the proposed language for § 8(d) (1) found in H. R. REP. No. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947) and the comment thereon in H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st. Sess. 33 (1947) with the proposed language for § 8(c) found in S. REP.
No. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947), the comment thereon in S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947), and the conference explanation found in H. REa.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947).
39 Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 266 (1959).
4 0 L. JAFFE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrIoN 22 (abr. student ed.
1965).4 1 See, e.g., American Shipbuilding v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 326 (1965) ; NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965) ; Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667,
676 (1961) ; NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960) ; NLRB v. Insur-
ance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499-500 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
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stantially reformulated and modified by a change in the leadership of
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
4 2
Assuming that the NLRB will continue to function as an adminis-
trative agency, I would like to direct attention to something other than
the instances in which the Board may have made unnecessary or even
unauthorized excursions into policy-making. I would like instead to
discuss the question how the Board, utilizing the powers that it has
as an administrative agency, might improve upon the techniques it
uses in formulating and revising those policy decisions that it in-
evitably must make.
My suggestions, and my principal criticism of the NLRB's policy
formulation and policy revision, relate to the Board's failure to utilize
its substantive rule-making powers. I first expressed my criticism of
the NLRB's neglect of its rule-making powers in an article published
in the Yale Law Journal in 1961.'s A similar criticism had been made
earlier by the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association,'"
and distinguished scholars and eminent practitioners have since joined
the chorus' 5  More significantly, Judge Henry J. Friendly has like-
wise suggested that the Board make use of its power to make sub-
stantive rules.4 Judge Friendly has not been the only member of the
judiciary to make such a suggestion.
47
There can be little doubt that the NLRB has the power to make
substantive rules. Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act
specifically states:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind in the manner prescribed by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.4
4 2 See T. ARNOLD, FAiR FIGHTS AND FOUL 120-30 (1965) ; Turner, Address Before
the American Bar Association, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 685 (1965).
43 Peck, The Atrophied Ride-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
44 ABA Comm. ON NLRB PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, PROCEEDINGS 116, 121 (1958).
45 1 K. DAviS, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 6.13 (1965 Pocket Part) ; Berger,
Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. 2Rzv. 371 (1967) ; Fuchs, Agency
Developments of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 781 (1965);
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Adminis-
trative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV. 921 (1965) ; Siegel, Problems and Procedures in the
NLRB Election Process, 66 LAB. REL. RE'. 259, 263-64 (1967).
46H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 145-47 (1962). See
also his opinions in NLRB v. Penn Cork & Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1967) ;
NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., Inc., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966) ; NLRB v. Lorben
Corp., 345 F.2d 346, 349 (2d Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion); NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods.
Co., 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1962).
47See Operating Engineers Local 49 v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir.
1965); McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 708 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
See also NLRB v. E. & B. Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 908 (1961).
48 NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
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What there is in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
indicates that the present language of the section was adopted instead
of other language that might have deprived the Board of substantive
rule-making powers.49 The NLRB does not deny that the statutory
authorization encompasses substantive rule-making powers. And, as
Professor Fuchs has pointed out, the phrase, "in the manner pre-
scribed by the Administrative Procedure Act" would be meaningless
except in relation to legally binding substantive regulations, for the
rule-making procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedure
Act do not apply to any other kind of rule-making. 0
The procedural requirements for substantive rule-making are
neither oppressive nor burdensome. The Board must publish general
notice of the proposed rule-making in the Federal Register, setting out
the time and place of the proceedings, the portion of the National
Labor Relations Act under which the rule was proposed, and the terms
or substance of the contemplated rule.5 The Act does not require an
adversary hearing, or even the reception of oral testimony or evidence.
All that is necessary is that there be an opportunity for interested
persons "to participate in the rule-making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to
present the same orally .... ," " Rules adopted do not become
effective until at least 30 days after their publication in the Federal
Register, unless the Board finds good cause for establishing an earlier
effective date. 3 Good practice might lead the Board to utilize more
formal hearing procedures, but no other restraints are imposed by
statute upon the Board's use of its substantive rule-making powers.
The absence of detailed prescriptions affords freedom and flexibility
for the formulation of policy through procedures that can be designed
for the particular occasion and problem.
Despite the ease with which the NLRB might have complied with
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Board has
failed to utilize its substantive rule-making powers formally, though I
49 The minority members of the House Committee on Labor and Education saw
in the proposed elimination of the Wagner Act's authorization to make "rules," as
contrasted with "regulations," an attempt to eliminate the Board's statutory authority
to make substantive rules. H.R. RES'. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1947). From
reinstatement of that authority one may infer an intent to preserve substantive rule-
making power. The matter is not, however, the subject of comment in the Conference
Report.
50 Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U. L.
Rav. 781, 798 (1965).
5' Administrative Procedure Act §4(a), 5 U.S.C. 1003(a) (1964), as amended,
5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) (1967).
5 Administrative Procedure Act §4(b), 5 U.S.C. 1003(b) (1964), as amended,
5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c) (1967).
r3Administrative Procedure Act §§3(a), 4(c), 5 U.S.C. 1002(a), 1003(c)
(1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(a), 553(d) (1967).
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believe that upon a number of occasions it has in fact done so sub rosa,
and hence improperly. One such instance was in July, 1954, when the
NLRB in two press releases announced new jurisdictional standards
which were first applied in decisions published three-and-one-half
months later. 54 Also, in 1958 changes were made in the contract bar
doctrine following an invitation, issued by press release to the interested
public, for comments on a number of pending casesY The Board
utilized those cases as vehicles for policy pronouncements and rule
changes going far beyond those necessary to dispose of the cases.
Indeed, the results in some of the cases were the same as they would
have been under the old rules.56 Although the proof is not quite
certain, I think it proper to conclude that the NLRB likewise engaged
in substantive rule-making without complying with the Administrative
Procedure Act in its American Potash & Chemical Corp. decision,
57
where it adopted a rule for determining appropriate bargaining units
that required severance of craft groups whenever the union which
sought to represent them was one which had traditionally represented
that craft.58 In the same category was the NLRB's 1957 determination
to outlaw all exclusive hiring hall agreements unless they contained
certain provisions limiting the encouragement of union membership
that ordinarily results from such agreements. 9
So far as I know, Board members have not undertaken to refute
charges of this sort, and I know of no court decision sustaining the
charges made."0 But well known authors in the field of administrative
law, although disagreeing with one another on a number of other
occasions, are in agreement that at least some of the charges are
justified." However, whether or not the Board has, on occasion,
acted in violation of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act is not as significant as the Board's persistent refusal to utilize its
4 Peck, supra note 43, at 735-38.
5 NLRB Press Release R-570 (July 22, 1958), 42 LAB. REL. REP. 363 (1958).
56 Id.
57 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
58 Peck, supra note 43, at 743-46.
59 Id. at 746-51.
1o Similar charges were, however, upheld by the First Circuit in Wyman Gordon
Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 301 (1968)
(No. 463). See notes 75-88 infra and accompanying text.
In a supplemental memorandum filed with the Subcommittee on the Separation of
Powers the NLRB has offered a defense of its failure to exercise rule-making powers.
69 LAB. REL. RP. 157. The defense is weakened by its reliance upon authorities who,
while perhaps not in agreement with each of the observations and criticisms made
here, have at least indicated general agreement with the proposition that the Board
should use its rule-making powers. E.g., Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Ad-
judication in the Developnwnt of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921 (1965).
61See 1 DAVIs, ADmInisTRATIVm LAw TREATIsE § 6.13 (1965 Pocket Part);
Berger, Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. Rwv. 371, 386-89 (1967).
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rule-making powers despite the urging of practitioners, academicians,
and judges that it do so.62
In 1961, for example, the Board, reconstituted with President
Kennedy's appointments, announced a policy change with respect to
the determination of appropriate bargaining units for insurance agents.
The earlier policy, adopted in 1944, had been to deny units of insurance
agents less than statewide or companywide in scope.' The case chosen
as the vehicle for announcing the policy change, Quaker City Life
Insurance Co.,' appeared to be no more than a routine three-page
representation decision. The rationale for the former rule had been
that unions engaged in organizing insurance agents would soon extend
their membership to statewide proportions, and hence that provisional
units of less than statewide scope were unnecessary if insurance agents
desired collective bargaining. Asserting, without statistical or other
support, that the expectation of statewide organization had not been
achieved, the Board concluded that there was no longer any reason
for applying a special rule for unit determinations in the insurance
industry.
The conclusion may have been sound. But it would have been
much more appropriate if it had been reached after the entire insurance
industry had been given the opportunity to participate in the analysis
of how extensive company or statewide organization had become, the
reasons it had not become more extensive, the considerations relating
to the desirability of the former rule, and variations of the new rule
that might be adopted in its place. Indeed, one might venture to
suggest that if this procedure had been followed, it would not have
been necessary, as the Supreme Court later found it to be in NLRB v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," to require the Board to articulate
the reason for the various unit determinations subsequently made in
the insurance industry in order to demonstrate that it was not giving
controlling effect to the extent of employee organization, a factor
which may be taken into account but which may not be made
conclusive.66
Similarly, in 1962 the NLRB overturned its long-standing rule
that in cases involving retail chain-store operations the appropriate unit
for collective bargaining should embrace employees of all stores located
within an employer's administrative division or geographic area. In
Say-On Drugs, Inc.,6 7 it announced a new policy under which determina-
02
See authorities cited supra notes 44-46.
63 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635 (1944).
64134 N.L.R.B. 960 (1961).
65380 U.S. 438 (1965).
6eSee NLRA § 9(c) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1964).
67138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
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tion of whether a proposed chain-store unit is appropriate will be made
in light of all the circumstances of the case. Analysis of the desirability
of the change was limited to a single paragraph of the majority opinion,
and was predicated upon the conclusion that the former policy had too
frequently operated to impede employees in the exercise of their rights
of self-organization. Again, the conclusion may have been sound;
but how much better it would have been if the empirical foundation had
been subjected to scrutiny and comment by the industry to which the
new rule was to be applied. Instead, although the NLRB knew that a
policy change was possible when it granted review of the regional
director's dismissal of the representation petition, the Board chose to
make the change in a decision that in form concerned only one
employer and one union. I submit that one of the consequences has
been judicial skepticism that the new policy is based upon anything
other than the prohibited emphasis on the extent of employee
organization.
6 8
Another significant policy change made with respect to the
appropriateness of bargaining units was the abandonment of the rule,
which had prevailed since 1954, under which any group of craft
employees was recognized as appropriate for severance if the union
which sought to represent it was one that had traditionally represented
that craft."9 It is true that the abandoned rule suffered from the
anomaly of not applying to the basic steel, aluminum, lumber, and wet
milling industries, and that it had been subjected to penetrating
criticism by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit."0 But only
blind deference to form could lead to the conclusion that the new criteria
for determining the appropriateness of craft units "' constituted a
rationale for the typical ad hoc or quasi-judicial decision rather than
rule-making of tremendous significance. Yet the NLRB chose to
give its new policy pronouncement the form of an administrative
decision.
Adjudication rather than rule-making continues as the preferred
means for announcing policy changes in the contract bar doctrine.
72
68 E.g., NLRB v. Capital Bakers, Inc., 351 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1965). See also
NLRB v. Davis Cafeteria, Inc., 358 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Frisch's Big
Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
eoAmerican Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
7O NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960).
71 The new criteria were announced in Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B.
No. 48, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 20,981 (1966).
72 See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962) ; Leonard Wholesale Meats,
Inc, 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962) ; Paragon Prods. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961).
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With few exceptions," the changes have been applied retroactively.
The consequence has been either to defeat the expectations of a union
which had undertaken an organizing campaign in the belief that it could
obtain an election, or to defeat the expectations of an employer who
thought he had bargained for and obtained a longer period of stable
employment relations. These injuries to both union and employer
expectations have been inflicted even though the prior rules were not
unworkable and even though the wealth of experience with the doctrine
accumulated by the NLRB since Wagner Act days certainly eliminated
the need for an experimental approach appropriate to novel problems.74
In Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,75 the NLRB announced what it
called "higher standards of disclosure" 76 requiring that within seven
days after approval of a consent-election agreement or direction of an
election an employer must file with the regional director an election
eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all eligible voters.
The list is then made available to the union and other interested parties
to assist them in their campaigning. The cases that evoked the
announcement came before the Board on exceptions to regional
directors' recommendations that objections to conduct affecting the
results of elections be overruled. Commendably, the NLRB issued an
invitation to certain interested parties to file amicus briefs and par-
ticipate in oral argument. That a number did so may account for the
fact that the opinion contains a more detailed analysis of the problem
than is found in certain of the Board's other decisions which have
made important policy announcements. Also commendably, the Board
determined that the new rule should be given prospective application,
governing only cases in which elections were directed or consented to
more than thirty days after the date of the decision. 77 But as I shall
suggest later, the reason for so limiting the application of the new
requirement may not have been any consideration of the evils of retro-
active application of law to private parties. As it was, the result in
these cases, one of which had arisen more than two years earlier, gave
to the unions involved only rewards comparable to those received by
a patient upon whom a lengthy, thrilling, and revolutionary operation
has been unsuccessfully performed. Here again, what was in fact rule-
making was accomplished as adjudication, without compliance with
the Administrative Procedure Act.
73 E.g., Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
74 See Berger, Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. Rsv. 371,
379-84 (1967) ; Peck, supra note 43, at 738-41, 756.
75156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
76Id. at 1239.
77156 N.L.R.B. at 1240 n.5.
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This was the conclusion recently reached by the First Circuit in
Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB.7" The court found that in promulgat-
ing the Excelsior rule, the NLRB had "designed its own rulemaking
procedure, adopting such part of the Congressional mandate [of the
Administrative Procedure Act] as it chose and rejecting the rest." "
The consequence was denial of enforcement to a NLRB subpoena for
a names-and-addresses list, even though the court indicated that it
had little or no objection to the substance of the rule or to the policy
it sought to effectuate. Such a failure to effectuate policy because of
the NLRB's reluctance to use formal rule-making procedures is, of
course, sufficient cause for regret. But even greater cause for regret
may be found by considering the benefits that might have been obtained
if the problem in Excelsior had not been limited by the fiction of
adjudication but instead had been open for the more complete exam-
ination available in rule-making.
Thus, as has been pointed out in an article critical of the Excelsior
decision,"0 several questions remained unanswered, such as whether an
employer could use alternative devices like outside mailing services to
meet a union's need for communication with employees; s whether a
union could waive its right to a list in exchange for an employer's
consent to an election; and what effect would be given to technical or
minor errors in the list.' Moreover, in a rule-making proceeding the
Board could have passed upon the question which it said was not before
it-"[w]hether or not an employer's refusal to disclose employee names
and addresses after an election has been directed would constitute
'interference, restraint or coercion' within the meaning of Section
8(a) (1) of the Act . . . ." If it had attached such consequences
to the refusal to disclose, the case might well have provided a means
other than the Board's subpoena power for compelling production. Use
of the subpoena power depends upon a conclusion that a list received
for the purpose of delivery to interested parties and not made part of
the record in any proceeding constitutes "evidence in such proceeding
or investigation" within the meaning of section 11(2) of the Act.'
78397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 301 (1968) (No. 463).
Judge Coffin, dissenting, did not disagree with the conclusion that the NLRB had
engaged in rule-making, but sought to justify the Board's action upon the ground that
the Excelsior rule is a procedural rule to which the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act do not apply. 397 F.2d at 398-99.
79 Id. at 397.
8o Siegel, supra note 45, at 259.
81 Montgomery Ward & Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1966).
8 2See Valley Die Cast Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 1881 (1966).
83 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1245 (1966).
84NLRA § 11(2), 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964).
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This point has been one upon which NLRB enforcement efforts have
at times falteredY.
Significantly for present purposes, on the same day that the
employee address list requirement was announced, the NLRB decided
two cases in which the unions contended that an employer's refusal to
allow a reply to an employer speech made on company time and com-
pany premises shortly before balloting prevented the holding of a free
and fair election."s They argued that the elections should therefore be
set aside. The Board invited certain interested parties to file briefs
amicus curiae and participate in oral argument. The problem involved
was one on which the Board's policy had vacillated in a way that
leaves little doubt that the vacillations were caused by changes in Board
membership17 The Board decided, however, that it would not make
any change in existing policy with regard to employer speeches on
company time. Its reason for doing so was that the Excelsior rule
requiring production of employee lists with addresses was expected to
create alternative opportunities for communication between unions
and employees, and that reconsideration of the policy should be deferred
until experience under the new rule had been accumulated and
analyzed.8
Once again the parties whose cases were chosen for consideration
of policy changes were subjected to substantial delay. One of the
cases involved an election held in August, 1964, and the other an
S5NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 279 F. Supp. 1 (D. N.J. 1968); NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,659 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 1967)
(M.D. Fla. 1966); NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 17,852 (M.D.
N.C. 1966), rev'd, 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968) ; see
Comment, Enforcement of the Excelsior Rule in the District Courts, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 1434, 1436-41 (1968).
86 General Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).
7 In 1951, an NLRB constituted primarily of members appointed by President
Truman decided that an employer violated § 8(a) (1) by making a speech to massed
employees on company time and denying the union an opportunity to reply on an
equal basis. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), renanded, 197 F.2d 640 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953). In December, 1953, a Board recon-
stituted by Eisenhower appointments overruled the Bonwit Teller doctrine, and held
that in the absence of either an unlawful, broad, no-solicitation rule or a privileged
no-solicitation rule (broad but not unlawful because of the character of the business),
an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a pre-election speech
on company time to his employees and denies the union's request for an opportunity to
reply. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 401 (1953). The Eisenhower appointees
charged that the Bonwit Teller doctrine was nothing more than the earlier captive-
audience doctrine, outlawed by § 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)
(1964), making a reappearance in scant disguise. Id. at 407. More recently, the
NLRB reconstituted with appointments made by President Kennedy announced that
the Bonwit Teller doctrine still had vitality as applied to a department store having a
broad, privileged, no-solicitation rule, and found that an employer had violated
§ 8(a) (1) by refusing to allow a union the opportunity to reply to an employer's
speech made on company time. May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962),
enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). As might be expected, the Eisen-
hower appointee remaining on the Board dissented. 136 N.L.R.B. at 804 (Member
Rogers, dissenting).
88 General Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966).
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election held in June, 1963. While it might be said that the protesting
unions had no reason to complain that they did not know that their
objections would not be considered meritorious until February, 1966,
the same cannot be said of the employers involved, over whose employ-
ment relations there loomed the unsettling possibility that they would
be held to have interfered with fair election procedures.
A similar fate awaits other parties if the Board undertakes adjudi-
catory reconsideration of the policy with respect to employer speeches
on company time after experience with the Excelsior rule has been
acquired. Why it should do so is not clear. The problem has been
identified. Conceivably, legal assistants to the Board members could
undertake a review of experience with the Excelsior rule so that the
Board could make a more informed judgment on the matter. This
would certainly be preferable to the seat-of-the-pants judgment one
suspects is sometimes made under the pretence of referring to ex-
perience. But certainly a better evaluation of the rule's operation could
be made if a summary, prepared by members of the General Counsel's
staff with field experience, were subjected to criticism and analysis by
all interested parties in rule-making proceedings.
Another example of the Board's lack of concern for the private
interests affected by retroactive application of rules announced in ad-
judication can be found in the recent decision of a three-member panel
which denied a union the certification to which the panel agreed the
union was entitled under preexisting rules.8 9 The rule announced by
the panel was that any conversation, other than minimal comments
which should be dismissed as trivial, between representatives of a party
and employees waiting to vote, would constitute cause for setting
aside the election regardless of the contents of the remarks exchanged.
The panel applied the new rule to the pending case though acknowledg-
ing that the Board had not previously "enunciated a clear standard
against which to measure" the effect of such conversations." The
justification for such Draconian regulation of conversations with voters
rested in part upon administrative convenience in avoiding the burden-
some task of examining the substance and effect of the conversations,
and in part upon the ease with which such a blanket prohibition is
understood and applied by the parties."' The former consideration,
administrative convenience, certainly supplies no justification for con-
demning conduct which was unobjectionable by Board standards in






effect at the time; and the latter consideration, certainty and ease of
application, obviously could have no bearing upon parties who could not
have been informed of the new rule.
Analysis of the unfair labor practice determinations made by the
NLRB in recent years likewise reveals a number of occasions upon
which the Board might better have resorted to rule-making rather
than adjudication for the announcement of new policies. In 1962 the
Board instituted a policy of requiring the payment of six per cent
interest on back-pay awards ordered when an employer is found to
have unlawfully discharged an employee. 2  There was nothing in the
fact pattern of the case used to announce the policy that made con-
sideration of the matter particularly appropriate, and, as the Board's
decision stated,"3 the General Counsel had made a similar request for
interest awards in a number of other cases. Rule-making procedures
would have avoided the appearance that the employer involved had
been randomly selected as the first to be subjected to the new rule.
More important, employers generally would have been able to make
comments and present arguments looking toward formulation of a rule
of general significance. Instead, the interests of employers in general
were represented through the brief filed by the single employer involved,
and the matter was decided without oral argument. Indeed, if rule-
making proceedings had been held, unions might have suggested a
matter not considered in the opinion: whether the six per cent rate
ordered by the Board is adequate, considering that discharged em-
ployees borrowing money will generally have to pay much higher rates
of interest to small loan companies.
As mentioned above, in 1964 the Board reversed an earlier policy
requiring a union to choose between filing a charge that an employer
has violated its duty to bargain and proceeding with a representation
election. The Board decided that a union which has lost a repre-
sentation election may nevertheless establish its status as bargaining
representative under the remedial order issued in an unfair labor
practice proceeding upon proof that the employer unlawfully refused
to bargain. The process by which the law has evolved in the four
years since that pronouncement has been very competently described
92 Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716 (1962), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 322 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963).
93 138 N.L.R.B. at 717.
94 Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). The policy thus replaced
was one that the Board had adopted in 1954 under the control of Eisenhower ap-
pointees, in Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954). For the pre-Aiello
policy, see joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 914 (1951).
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and criticized elsewhere. 5 For our purposes, it is enough to note that
at a high point in the development of the doctrine, the NLRB said it
would issue a bargaining order even though it did not find a refusal
to bargain, if meritorious objections were filed in a pending repre-
sentation case and the employer's misconduct warranted the setting
aside of the election.96 Subsequent decisions indicate a softening of the
Board's position with respect to establishment of bargaining status
without an election,9 7 and I doubt that the Board would now issue a
bargaining order in the absence of a finding that the employer had
refused to bargain.
Probably the policy change, or the correction of policy, made
in this instance 9 was of such dimension that the experimental ad hoc
approach of adjudication was more appropriate than an attempt to
anticipate and deal with all the problems in advance. However, the
course of policy development is now strewn with the decisional remnants
of the experimental approach. The experiments have been conducted;
it is time to clean up the laboratory and write the report. The time
has come for the Board to bring order and certainty to the area through
rule-making proceedings. Judge Friendly made a similar suggestion
to the Board in 1965 with respect to one aspect of the problem: whether
an authorization of union representation is invalid because of statements
to employees about initiation fees. 9 He repeated his suggestion in
1967 with respect to the entire problem of what a union authorization
card should say and what misrepresentations concerning its use would
invalidate it as proof of a union majority. 1°° But at the present time
the Board's insistence on proceeding only by adjudication has deprived
us of the clarification and certainty that might be obtained through
rule-making.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and
Judge Friendly in a dissenting opinion, have urged rule-making with
respect to what they called the recurring problem of the permissible
95 Gordon, Union Authorization Cards and the Duty to Bargain, 67 LAB. REL.
REP. 165 (1968) ; Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB
Election, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 851 (1967); Comment, Employer "Good Faith Doubt,"
116 U. PA. L. Rlv. 709 (1968).96 Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627, 629 (1964).
97 Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
The Board does continue to make statements indicating that extensive 8(a) (1)
violations standing alone would provide a sufficient basis for a bargaining order if they
destroyed a majority established on a card check basis. E.g., Hecks Inc., 172 NLRB
No. 225, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 20,202 (Sept. 24, 1968). However, the cases in
which the statements have been made recently are all cases in which there was a
demand for bargaining which the employer unlawfully refused.98 See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
99 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1965)
(concurring opinion).




limits of employer questioning of employees concerning union affiliation
and activities,'' but the Board's response has been no more than a clari-
fying adjudicatory decision..02  Reviewing courts have likewise found
no response to suggestions that the Board make rules with respect to
such matters as whether an employer's liability for back pay should be
tolled for the period of time between a trial examiner's dismissal of a
charge and a Board decision to the contrary.1 3 Judge Friendly was
ready to make failure to utilize rule-making powers the basis for re-
versal of the Board when it abandoned its rule that negotiation of a
contract with a minority union did not violate the Act if the contract
was conditioned upon the union establishing a majority among the
employees.' 4  However, a procedural matter-failure to give notice
that the legality of the negotiation was an issue-provided a surer
ground for reversal. 0 5 In 1966 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit also expressed the view that the Board could do a better job
of developing policy considerations and outlining minimal standards
for the problems related to fines assessed by unions against members, 06
but the Board has manifested no interest in doing so. Despite the
administrative fiasco of ad hoc outlawing of exclusive hiring halls,
1 7
the Board has never responded to the Sixth Circuit's suggestion that
the Board might have more success if it utilized its substantive rule-
making powers. 08
Other examples might be discussed,' but I think it may be taken
as established that the NLRB persists in its refusal to utilize its rule-
making power, and adamantly adheres to adjudication as the sole
vehicle for announcement and revision of policy. The proposition that
rule-making proceedings are not suited to the functions of the NLRB
has been proven false by the Board's use on a number of occasions
of what in substance must be viewed as rule-making, but rule-making
conducted without all the benefits and protections that would be
obtained through compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act
101 Operating Engineers Local 49 v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
102 Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1385 (1967).
103 See the suggestion for such a rule in NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods., Inc., 316 F.2d
899, 905 (2d Cir. 1963).
104 NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 859-61 (2d Cir. 1966).
105 Id. at 861-63.
106 Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966).
107 See Peck, mipra note 43, at 746-51.
108 NLRB v. E. & B. Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 908 (1961).
100 E.g., McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 708 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), set aside and remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
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and hence subject to judicial disapproval as "agency action . . . found
to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law." 11
Receipt of amicus briefs and oral arguments in some cases in
which policy changes were made was certainly preferable to deciding
the matter solely upon the basis of argument by the General Counsel
and whoever happened to be the attorneys for the private parties in-
volved. But in many cases the argument takes place on the basis of
a record compiled without knowledge that a policy change was in the
offing. Undoubtedly more information could be obtained from the
affected public in a rule-making proceeding. The peculiar facts of a
particular case and the issues thereby suggested in light of precedent
must be a poor substitute for the more comprehensive rules that are
or should be under consideration. The experience of all affected parties
might enable them to point out defects in the comprehensive rules that
are unforeseen or of no interest to the parties involved in the ad-
judicatory proceeding. Indeed, in this respect the adjudicatory aspects
of the proceeding may be a distraction from the more important policy
formulation taking place.
The product of adjudication is also inferior to what could be
produced by rule-making insofar as it serves as a guide to the agency
staff and the regulated public. Unless the adjudicatory decision is dis-
torted with dictum on situations not involved in the case being decided,
both agency and regulated public must resort to reading a line of cases
and formulating from them a statement of the principles or policies
followed by the NLRB with respect to a particular matter. This is not
only time-consuming and expensive because of its dependence upon
specialized talents cultivated primarily by lawyers, but also productive
of error and conflict because of inevitable misreadings. It may be true
that few of the specialists in labor law have been misled by the NLRB's
failure to use its rule-making powers, but to the extent possible the
Board should try to be of service to non-specialists, whether laymen
or lawyers.
I have suggested that adjudication may have an adverse effect
upon the determination of policy and the development of rules. I would
also like to suggest that use of adjudication for policy formulation may
also have adverse effects upon the adjudicatory product. The parties
to the proceedings selected for announcement of changes in policy may
find themselves swept up into a maelstrom of argument ranging far
beyond their immediate concerns. In such a situation attention may
be directed away from the peculiar facts of what might otherwise be
a relatively unimportant case.
110 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964), as amended
5 U.S.C. § 706(D) (1967) ; see Peck, mi'pra note 43, at 754-55.
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For example, in one of the cases involved in the 1958 revision
of the contract bar doctrine,"1 the Board devoted seven pages of its
decision to a hypothetical discussion of how it would decide cases
involving other parties and other facts. Only four pages of the decision
were devoted to the case at hand, and those pages included the Board's
rejection of the petitioning union's reasonable suggestion that the new
rules be made prospective in operation. The Board rejected the sug-
gestion because it thought that issuance of a prospective decision would
create "an administrative monstrosity." 11 Perhaps in a proper ad-
judicative proceeding the merits of the union's suggestion would have
been recognized.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit refused enforcement of the
Board's order in the case in which it announced that payment of
interest would be required on back pay due under reinstatement
orders." 3 The reason for denying enforcement was the rather unusual
one that the evidence supporting the Board's fact findings did not meet
the test established by the Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp."
4
One wonders whether such errors in fact finding would have been made
if attention had been focused on adjudicatory facts rather than the
more exciting policy issue.
One of the most serious adverse effects of using the adjudicatory
process for policy formulation is, of course, the retroactive effect upon
parties who legitimately relied upon the former rules. For example,
it is probably sound to rule that execution of a collective bargaining
agreement with a minority union is prohibited assistance under section
8(a) (2) 115 even though the effectiveness of the agreement is deferred
until such time as the union obtains a majority. But as Judge Friendly
has said, the judicial hackles rise when such a ruling is applied to
require refund of union dues and initiation fees by employers who
relied upon clear Board precedent that such an agreement was permitted
under the Act."
Courts make retroactive policy changes in the course of their
adjudications, but courts have no substantive rule-making powers.
The comparison provides no comfort for the NLRB, and indeed is
embarrassing when consideration is given to the growing use of prospec-
tive overruling by courts to avoid the evils of retroactivity.
17
"II Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958).
" 2 Id. at 1006-07.
13 NLRB v. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 322 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963).
114 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
"15 NLRA § 8(a) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1964).
116 NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966).
"7 See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962) ; Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; Parker v.
Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Spanel v. Mounds View
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This is not to say that the NLRB has never made a prospective
ruling. It did so in establishing the Excelsior requirement that em-
ployers furnish lists of the names and home addresses of employees for
delivery to interested parties." 8 A few of the decisions involving
changes in the contract bar doctrine were also given prospective ap-
plication."' But the uncomfortable impression gained from reading
the cases is that the reason for making those rulings prospective was
that retroactive rulings would have interfered with the NLRB's
processing of its caseload. In short, to serve its own interests, rather
than out of consideration for the parties involved, the NLRB is willing
to create what it once called "an administrative monstrosity." 20 But
for private parties, even though there is no pressing need and alterna-
tives are readily available, the Board has employed what Jeremy
Bentham called "dog law": the dog learns from the blow that follows
that his master does not approve of what the dog has done.' 2 '
Of course there are other matters of self-interest behind the
Board's adherence to adjudication for announcement of policy changes.
Though judicial realists have effectively demolished the proposition
that courts do not make law, there still remains some aura of "finding
the law" through the adjudicatory process. It is not the policy
preferences of the adjudicator that are placed in effect; instead the
true law is found, or the error of earlier adjudicators corrected. The
adjudicator need not justify the policies because they are not his; they
have existed for all time, or at least since the particular statute involved
was enacted.
Even if the adjudicator is willing to admit performing a policy-
making function, he may prefer the maneuverability of the adjudicatory
process. Having set out the adjudicatory decision, the administrator
may observe what happens to it without exposing the entire scheme
that will be put into effect if the decision finds acceptance. If the
decision fails to obtain acceptance, a much less embarrassing retreat
may be made.'22 If a reviewing court enforces the adjudicatory order
School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) ; Graham v. Rolandson, 435 P.2d
263, 274 (Mont. 1967); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d
618 (1962) ; Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA.
L. Rav. 1 (1960); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in
the Federal Courts, 71 YAL L.J. 907 (1962).
118 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
119 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453 (1962); Leonard Wholesale
Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962); Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275
(1961).
1
2 0 Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1006-07 (1958).
1215 THE WORKS OF JEREmY BENTHAM 235 (1st ed. J. Bowring 1808), quoted in
C. GREGORY, LAOR AND THE LAW 52 (1st ed. 1946).
=-e See Siegel, supra note 80, at 264.
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on some other ground, the administrator may continue to pursue his
policy, perhaps with refinements gained from the experience.2 3 To
make policy determinations by substantive rule would, from the
administrator's viewpoint, have the unfortunate effect of binding the
agency until such time as the rule were changed by regular
proceedings.'
It is with regret that I make these suggestions. My regret is
not that from time to time the NLRB makes policy decisions or
revises policy. It is with the manner in which the Board does so. As
I have already indicated, I think it impossible that the NLRB escape
a policy-making role. Statutes cannot be drawn with a clairvoyant
precision that eliminates all subsequent policy-making. As Justice
Frankfurter said in a different but related context, "There are no
talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment." '2 Deciding
when an administrative agency should proceed to develop policy on
an ad hoc basis through adjudication and when it should resort to
formal rule-making involves judgment upon a multitude of factors.
The choice of an appropriate procedure, as the Supreme Court has
said, must be the product of the exercise of an informed discretion."2
But the Board's blanket refusal to utilize its conceded rule-making
powers compels the conclusion that the NLRB has been derelict in
failing to take advantage of the flexibility possible in the administrative
process.
Of particular relevance is the fact that rule-making proceedings
would clearly identify the policy-making activities of the NLRB, thus
facilitating supervision by the courts and by Congress. Rule-making
proceedings, while by no means a substitute for representative govern-
ment, would provide interested parties with an opportunity to be heard
and to present their views on policies of importance to them. As it
is, the regulated public all too frequently learns of a policy change after
its adoption. Then the public must bear the burden of persuading
administrators that the change they have already made is erroneous or
should be altered in one respect or another. It would be to ignore too
much of what we know of human nature to say that this additional
burden is not a significant one. Finally, even if we must expect the
administrative development to reflect the political factors which deter-
mine appointment to the agency, the inevitable changes will be more
acceptable if they are announced prospectively, as is legislation, which,
of course, is likewise affected by political factors.
123 See Shapiro, mipra note 45, at 944-45.
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